La référence des hélicoptères de manœuvre et d'assaut

On 28th of March 2014 the NH90 flight of HTI (Helicopter Transition Unit) gathered to celebrate achieving 1000 flying hours on the RNZAF NH90 fleet. Our new medium utility Helicopter continues to meet its introduction into service programme and showed during exercise ALAM HALFA that it is very capable and versatile.

read more: http://www.airforce.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/airforce-news/afn159.pdf

NHI celebrated the 200th NH90 helicopter delivery.

The 200th NH90, a TTH (Tactical Transport Helicopter) variant, was delivered officially to Belgian Defence and will be operated from Beauvechain Air Force Base by the 1st Wing. The handover ceremony took place during the annual NH90 Product Conference being held this year at the German Army Aviation School in Bückeburg, where the whole NH90 community of users and industry is gathered to share their experiences.

“In the name of NHI and its partner companies, I am really honoured to deliver this NH90 TTH to Belgium. With this versatile, safe and interoperable aircraft, NHI is proud to contribute to the enhancement of Belgian Defence capabilities”, said Vincent Dubrule, President of NHIndustries at the ceremony.
“This 200th delivery is the result of the efforts of industry to ramp up the delivery rate of the NH90 since this new generation helicopter is in high demand by its end users” Dubrule added.

The NH90 Product Conference took place for the first time at the German Army Aviation School, Bückeburg, near Hanover.

“This School, with its 14 full flight mission simulators is the most modern Army Helicopter Training School in Europe, it is able to train pilots and crews on several types of new generation helicopters such as the NH90 and EC135” declares Col Baumgärtner Public Relations Officer of the Army Aviation School.

This facility will become the “International Helicopter training Centre” in July 2015 when it will start to train foreign military helicopter aircrews as well as continuing to train German flight and maintenance crews.

From left to right: Col Vandzande, Belgian Armed Forces;

Luigi Cereti, Managing Director of NHIndustries;

Vincent Dubrule, President of NHIndustries

“The NH90 program is now reaching its maturity phase with more than 50.000 flight hours logged in service in the most demanding conditions” declares Luigi Cereti, Managing Director of NHIndustries.

“The NH90 program is of great importance to Belgium as it will maintain our SAR service, provide an enlarged range of missions in support of the Navy and for the first time give us the ability to perform tactical troop transport missions. Furthermore, by joining this international program, Belgium is improving its helicopter interoperability” said Col Vandezande, Head of the NH90 program for Belgian Armed Forces.

“The delivery of this third NH90 TTH today enables us to progress from initial training to the Operational Training and Evaluation phase” added Col Vandezande.

Bückeburg. Alle Nationen, die den Mehrzweckhubschrauber NH90 im Einsatz haben, geben sich derzeit ein Stelldichein an der Heeresfliegerwaffenschule in Bückeburg, die ab Juli 2015 als Internationales Ausbildungszentrum firmieren wird. Im Mittelpunkt der von „NHIndustries“ veranstalteten „Product Conference“ steht der Erfahrungsaustausch der Nationen, die den NH90 bereits im Einsatz haben: neben Deutschland, Frankreich und Italien auch die Niederlande, Schweden, Finnland, Norwegen und Griechenland, aber auch Australien, Neuseeland oder Oman. Am Nachmittag wurde außerdem das 200. Exemplar der NH90 offiziell an die belgische Luftwaffe übergeben. Weitere 300 hat NHI derzeit noch in den Orderbüchern stehen, wie Vincent Dubrule, Präsident von NHI bei der Übergabe sagte: „Ein großer Schritt für unser Unternehmen.“ Dann übergab er ein Modell der NH90 an Major Johan Vangenechten von den belgischen Streitkräften, denn: „Einen Schlüssel gibt es nicht.“ Am Morgen waren die rund 200 Teilnehmer vom Kommandeur der Heeresfliegerwaffenschule und General der Heeresflieger, Brigadegeneral Alfons Mais, in Bückeburg begrüßt worden. Er wünschte den Teilnehmern eine gute Konferenz und einen schönen Aufenthalt in Bückeburg.

With the NH90 programme hampered by the vast number of different variants being produced since its inception, NHIndustries is looking to develop a single standard for future customers

as it marks its 200 delivery of an NH90 medium helicopter.

In 2013, NLR was closely involved in risk reduction of NH90 operations in potentially hostile environment. Mission areas in which Royal Netherlands Air Force and Royal Netherlands Navy aircraft operate can be hazardous. A well aimed shot from an automatic weapon or an engagement by a heat-seeking or radar-guided missile may cause severe or catastrophic damage to an aircraft and even casualties. NLR conducts so-called CATCH trials, commissioned by the Ministry of Defence. During these trials, risk reducing technical and tactical countermeasures for both helicopter and aircraft crews are evaluated. The 17th CATCH trial was conducted last year. The objective of this trial was to evaluate the NH90 helicopter, as it too must be able to deploy safely in potentially hostile areas.

The Netherlands has suspended further deliveries of NH90 NATO Frigate Helicopter (NFH) aircraft destined for the Dutch armed forces due to corrosion issues.  

The Dutch MoD announced on 27 June that it had asked the NATO Helicopter Management Agency (NAHEMA) to suspend further deliveries due to the excessive levels of corrosion.

Contractual and design issues around the Australian Defence Force's (ADF's) fleet of MHR90 multirole helicopters have delayed the anticipated date of final operational capability (FOC) by nearly five years, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) has disclosed.

In a report released on 25 June the ANAO said FOC for the 46-strong MRH90 fleet - 27 of which had been delivered as of May 2014 - was now scheduled for April 2019, 57 months later than the original estimate.

The report added that the "difficulties experienced by the MRH90 Program are primarily a consequence of program development deficiencies and acquisition decisions during the period 2002 to 2006."

The MRH90 is being acquired under Project Air 9000 at a budgeted cost of AUD4.013 billion (USD3.73 billion) to replace as a composite fleet the army's 35 S-70A9 Blackhawks and six now-retired Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Sea Kings.

As part of an agreement in May 2013 covering disputed programme issues, a 47th MRH90 is being supplied by prime contractor Australian Aerospace, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Airbus Helicopters, at no additional cost. This will be used as a live training aid for army and navy aviation technicians.

Design of the MRH90 (the Australian designation for the NH Industries NH90) had proven to be more developmental than expected at source selection, the ANAO report stated. Many key capability requirements were not included in the acquisition contract signed in 2006, leaving the DoD without contractual remedies for related shortfalls.

"Considerable work remains to implement and verify some design changes, and to adjust operational tactics, techniques, and procedures, in order to develop an adequate multirole helicopter capability for army and navy operations," the report said.

A large number of aircraft design issues had impacted the achievement of capability milestones. As of April 2014, the MRH90 self-defence gun system, cabin seating and cargo hook were being redesigned to overcome significant operational deficiencies.

Low aircraft reliability, maintainability, and flying rate of effort had also adversely affected aircrew training, and capability schedules.

Australian Military Type Certification was received in April 2013, 53 months later than originally scheduled. The army's first airmobile capability was scheduled for September 2014, a delay of 41 months, while the first operational capability for the RAN's aircraft was currently 45 months late.

Operational test and evaluation was yet to validate any of the 11 operational capabilities set by the two services, the report said.

However, in April 2014 the ANAO was told by the Department of Defence (DoD) that the MRH90 had shown the potential to offer greater capability in some areas than the Blackhawk and the Sea King, and operational tactics, techniques, and procedures were being adjusted to account for the differences between the platforms.

21st of June 2014: Gilze-Rijen Airbase - Dutch Air Force Days

Eine Übung des Forward Air Medevac NH-90 in Masar-i Scharif, Afghanistan. 
Spätestens 15 Minuten nach Alarmierung muss der Hubschrauber abheben. Dann fliegt er mit 300 km/h seinem Einsatzort entgegen, teilweise nur wenige Meter über den Boden.
Nach Aufnahme der Verwundeten hebt der NH-90 nach nur wenigen Minuten wieder ab. Während der gesamten Zeit wird er von einem weiteren NH-90 mit zwei Maschinengewehren gesichert.

Quelle: Zentralredaktion der Bundeswehr
Kamera und Redaktion: EKT MeS
14Z18701
06/14

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) has released a damning report into the acquisition and service introduction of the NHI/Australian Aerospace MRH90 helicopter which was acquired under Project AIR 9000 Phases 2, 4 & 6.

The acquisition of the MRH90 for all three phases of the project – to acquire an additional squadron of helicopters under Phase 2, to replace the S-70A-9 Black Hawks in service under Phase 4, and to replace Navy’s Sea Kings under Phase 6 – was a key component of the ADF’s Helicopter Strategic Master Plan which sought to reduce the number of helicopter types in ADF service from nine to five, and thus realise greater training, support and sustainment efficiencies.

The report into the $4 billion project revealed that the ADF’s original recommendation to buy 12 new-build Sikorsky S-70M (UH-60M) Black Hawks for Phase 2 and up to 36 new build S-70Ms (or remanufactured S-70A-9s) for Phase 4 in June 2004 was overruled by the then Howard coalition government, despite Sikorsky’s bid being significantly cheaper than Australian Aerospace’s.

The report says the Black Hawk recommendation had the support of the Secretary for Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force, the Chief of CDG, the CEO of the DMO, the Chief of Army, and the Chief of Air Force. It said Defence’s recommendation was based on the Black Hawk’s cost advantage, its robust construction, ballistic protection and crashworthiness.

But Defence had also found that the MRH90 would also meet the capability requirement - it considered that it was better marinised for amphibious operations, and that Australian Aerospace’s bid had Australian industry capability advantages.

The report highlights “program development deficiencies and acquisition decisions during the period 2002 to 2006” as the primary causes of the difficulties experienced by the MRH90 program. It says that period included “requirements definition, the source selection process and the establishment of acquisition and sustainment contracts”, and that these crucial stages of program development were not appropriately performed, leading to “serious and potentially long‑term consequences for capability delivery and Commonwealth expenditure.” It said the the maturity of the MRH90 and S-70M Black Hawk aircraft designs had not been properly assessed.

With the acquisition of MRH90, the S-70A-9 Black Hawk fleet which was built in the 1980s was to have been withdrawn between January 2011 and December 2013. But the withdrawal didn’t commence until January 2014, and is now not scheduled to be completed until June 2018. The original project schedule called for Final Operational Capability (FOC) of 46 MRH90s to be achieved in July 2014, but this now not expected to be realised until April 2019, a delay of nearly five years.

The report says the extended concurrent operations of both the Black Hawk and MRH90 fleets has led to “significant problems for funding of Army aviation” leading to likely “compromises to levels of capability,” and also identifies the capability gap experienced by Navy since its Sea Kings were retired in 2011.

Some positives from the report include the results from a series of trials conducted aboard HMAS Choules in 2012 which showed the MRH90 has impressive handling over the deck and showed considerable potential for embarked operations. Defence says the MRH90 has shown that it has the “potential to offer greater capability in some areas than the Black Hawk and the Sea King,” and that “Defence continues to adjust operational tactics, techniques and procedures to account for the differences between the platforms.”

The report says that by March 2014 more than $2.4 billion had been spent on the program, and that 27 MRH90s had been delivered. It highlighted that the program was running more than four years behind schedule, with the first operational capability milestones for both the Army and the Navy yet to be achieved.

It said “considerable work remains to implement and verify some design changes, and to adjust operational tactics, techniques and procedures, in order to develop an adequate multi‑role helicopter capability for Army and Navy operations.” These design changes include the self-defence gun system, cabin seating and cargo hook, all of which needed to “overcome significant operational deficiencies.” It said operational test and evaluation was yet to validate any of the 11 operational capability milestones set by the Army and Navy.

The report can be read here: 

https://www.dropbox.com/s/ne803yl9it0ymol/AuditReport_2013-2014_52.pdf

Last week saw the release of the latest Australian National Audit Office report into defence acquisitions. In the firing line this time is the multi-role helicopter program. Like most audit reports, the ANAO has carefully unpacked the process behind this troubled acquisition—now over four years late and, like many other audited projects, well ensconced on the projects of concern list.

But unlike most audit reports, there’s a big gap in this one. The ANAO reports that the Howard government’s decision to acquire the European-sourced MRH90 rather than the American S-70M Black Hawk was taken against the advice provided from Defence. Because those deliberations are covered by Cabinet confidentiality, we can’t be sure why that was the case. My suspicion is that the deciding factor was the prospect of greater Australian industry involvement in the European bid.

But even without the missing data there’s plenty of meat in this report. As I’ve written previously, the background is the early 2000s Defence helicopter rationalisation plan. The idea behind the plan was to reduce the number of types of helicopters in the ADF’s inventory in order to reduce the overall cost of ownership. Each new type brings with it a new set of fixed costs and a new supply chain, so rationalisation made good sense. If the Army and Navy could have helicopters with a high degree of commonality and shared supply chains, it’d cut down the overall cost. So far, so good.

Now fast forward to the present day, and we find the Navy is in the process of taking delivery of 24 new Romeo model Seahawk combat helicopters from the United States, while the Army continues to operate its Black Hawks as DMO and the contractor (Australian Aerospace, a subsidiary of Airbus Helicopters) try to get the MRH90s up to speed. Moreover, Army has a strong preference for retaining the Black Hawk for the counter-terrorism role. (That’s long been the case and the audit report notes the same preference as early as 2004.) In other words, despite considerable investment of time and money, little rationalisation has been achieved. Rather than a Seahawk/Black Hawk fleet, or one based on a combination of Airbus land and marine helicopters, we’ll have variants of each for the foreseeable future.

The root cause of the problem seems to have been a combination of government’s willingness to weigh industry involvement highly in its selection criteria and Defence’s inability to provide an accurate picture of the maturity and costs of the respective bids. Defence’s preference for the Black Hawk was based on its assessment that it offered superior battlefield protection and robustness, although the MRH90 was judged to be ahead for amphibious work. But it didn’t manage to put forward a case robust enough to convince the government that the capability differential outweighed other factors. As the ANAO notes:

Defence was not positioned to readily identify areas in need of developmental work for the respective aircraft, and to confidently inform ministers on the respective strengths and weaknesses of the proposals.

That wasn’t the only problem with the submission that went forward to government—the costing data was shaky as well. The proffered costs showed the Black Hawks to be $275 million less expensive to acquire, but with an estimated $10 million per year greater operating cost:

The submission also included estimated support costs, but with low confidence. An additional squadron of MRH90 aircraft was estimated to cost $60 million per annum and a squadron of S-70M aircraft $70 million per annum.

That should’ve been a red flag—the acquisition and support costs for major platforms both tend to be driven by system complexity, and manufacturer claims that through-life costs will be lower for a more expensive machine should be regarded with great suspicion. In this case, the ‘low confidence’ figures weren’t robust enough for sensible decision making (and were almost certainly wrong). Of course, responsibility needs to be shared here; the government took the decision despite the admitted poor quality of the cost data.

In an unusual step, the ANAO doesn’t make any recommendations in this report. Instead it notes (Exec Summary paragraph 51) that Defence has the right management processes in place to do what’s necessary to inform government decision making—it just failed to implement them properly in this instance. Of course, there’s a lot more to this story, and interested readers should read at least the summary of the ANAO report. I’ll let them have the last word:

If there was just one lesson to learn from the history of Defence acquisition projects, it would be the need to be respectful of the inherent risks in these complex transactions and not over-confident that they are under control. … Defence was on the back foot from the start in its ability to confidently offer advice, in not having a sound understanding of the requirements or the estimated costs, and has been endeavouring to recover ever since, with mixed success.

Nordic nations have struggled with their much-delayed Nordic Standard Helicopter Program (NSHP), especially since capability shortages have appeared since 2010 in combat, troop transport and medical evacuation missions.

Under a $1.3 billion NSHP project agreement reached in 2001, NHIndustries was contracted to deliver 52 twin-engine NH90 utility helicopters to Sweden, Finland and Norway starting in 2004 and 2005. NHIndustries is a European consortium owned by Airbus Helicopters (62.5 percent), Italy’s AgustaWestland (32 percent) and Fokker Aerostructures of the Netherlands (5.5 percent).

By the end of 2010, just four NH90s had been delivered to Sweden and Norway. Deliveries were further complicated when the three Nordic customers opted not to purchase a common helicopter type, choosing instead to request customized features prior to delivery.

In the case of Sweden, serial postponements provoked a critical shortage of tactical and transport aircraft for operations in Afghanistan after 2008. The crisis forced the government to allocate special funds to purchase 15 Sikorsky Aircraft UH-60M Black Hawks (HKP16) at a cost of $550 million.

This was envisioned as a stopgap measure to ensure the armed forces had sufficient aircraft available for both domestic and international operations until the NH90s (Swedish Army designation HKP 14) arrived.

The unscheduled Black Hawk acquisition meant that the budget for the Swedish Helicopter Equipment Acquisition Program (HEAP) for 2010-2020 increased from $625 million to almost $1 billion. Under the recast HEAP, the Air Force plans to have full Black Hawk and NH90 fleets operational by 2020.

Sweden ordered 18 NH90s with an option for a further seven under the 2001 NSHP agreement. Finland placed orders for 20 NH90s while Norway’s requirement was 14 helicopters with an option to purchase an additional 10. The NH90 unit purchase cost averaged $25 million.

Under Sweden’s HEAP, the $450 million acquisition budget for the 18 NH90s will rise to $625 billion if the Air Force exercises the option to acquire an additional seven units.

Black Hawks in Action

“There was a very real need to address the operational needs of the Army and enable them to carry out their important missions in Afghanistan with modern and combat-tested helicopters,” said Karin Enström, Sweden’s defense minister. “The investment strengthens the armed forces’ all-weather capacity to operate at home and abroad, and in the most demanding conditions.”

The acquisition of Black Hawks, the first batch of which have supported Swedish troops in Afghanistan since November, has reduced pressure on the Swedish Air Force to meet the need to release combat-ready helicopters for overseas missions, said Joop Alders, a defense analyst based in The Hague.

“The Black Hawks are proving a good all-round capability fit for a Swedish defense organization that is changing to a modular brigade structure,” he said. “This format will have a higher requirement for a battle proven, medium-weight helicopter system.”

The Defense Ministry’s decision to buy Black Hawks followed inconclusive talks with NHIndustries, which was unable to confirm fixed NH90 delivery dates. As a result, the FMV, Sweden’s defense materiel procurement agency, was instructed to open talks with Sikorsky in April 2011.

By May 2011, the FMV had signed an agreement for 15 UH-60Ms through the U.S. government’s Foreign Military Sales program.

The $546 million investment includes 34 T700-GE-701D General Electric engines, AN/AAR-57v3 Common Missile Warning Systems, AN/APR-39 radar signal-detecting sets, AN/AVR-2B laser warning sets, aviation mission planning stations, transportable operations simulators; communications equipment, spare parts, repair kits and maintenance support equipment.

Under an accelerated delivery schedule, six Black Hawks were delivered in 2011 and the remaining nine in 2012. The first two HKP 16s (Sweden’s designation for the Black Hawks) were delivered to the Malmen Helicopter Base in mid-December 2011. All 15 Black Hawks are expected to be fully operational by 2017.

“This was an easy decision for us to make. The HKP 16 is a proven system. Over 3,000 Black Hawks have been supplied to various customers in the world,” said FMV’s project manager, Magnus Larsson.

The deal saw Sweden become the first European country to acquire the US Army’s UH-60M model.

The first two HKP 16 Black Hawks entered service in Afghanistan during the first half of 2013, attached to the Swedish military base at Camp Marmal. The HKP 16s supported or replaced Eurocopter AS332/HKP 10B Super Puma helicopters in troop transport, medevac and search-and-rescue (SAR) roles.

Despite the protracted delivery schedule, Sweden plans to complete the NH90 acquisition, which comprises 13 tactical troop transport/SAR and five anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters.

Delay in Norway

Difficulties in securing delivery of the NH90 also limited the Norwegian Defense Force’s ability to maintain a ready supply of modern helicopters for domestic and international missions in 2010 to 2012.

In June 2012, Norway’s MoD signaled that it might cancel the NH90 order and was reported to have contacted Sikorsky regarding a possible accelerated purchase of the MH-60 Seahawk ASW variant as an alternative.

But NHIndustries delivered a second NH90 NFH (NATO frigate variant helicopter) in December 2012, easing the situation. The first was delivered in December 2011.

The ship-borne helicopters will be deployed on the Royal Norwegian Navy’s Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates and Coast Guard vessels operating off the country’s Arctic northern coast and in the Barents Sea.

The NH90 segment of Norway’s helicopter modernization program will cost $350 million based on 14 units bought, and up to $600 million if the additional 10 are acquired. When fully operational in 2017 to 2018, the NH90 NFHs would fill the role currently executed by the Royal Norwegian Navy’s multirole Bell, Lynx and Sea King SAR aircraft.

Finland, too, has encountered delivery delays in its order of 20 NH90 tactical transport helicopters. The contract, valued at around $500 million, was renegotiated in August.

Under the revised schedule, initial deliveries will be completed by the end of this year, some six years behind schedule. Completion of the full delivery program has been extended to 2018.

Other Deals

Norway continues to invest heavily in its offshore SAR capability. In December, it contracted AgustaWestland to deliver 16 AW101 all-weather SAR helicopters, with deliveries scheduled in 2017 to 2020.

The $1.6 billion deal, which includes life-cycle support, parts and an option for six more aircraft, is intended to provide the Royal Norwegian Air Force with an enhanced SAR capability in High North waters, supporting naval and Coast Guard operations.

Denmark also has been strengthening its heli-capability through a $686 million maritime helicopter replacement program, which will see the Royal Danish Air Force acquire nine Sikorsky/Lockheed Martin MH-60R Seahawks. The aircraft, which will replace Lynx 90B helicopters, are scheduled to be delivered between 2016 and 2018.

Routed through the US Foreign Military Sales program, the MH-60R acquisition is intended to support the Danish plan to deploy more ship-borne helicopters on vessels operating in Denmark’s Arctic territories, covering the Faroe Islands and Greenland.

“Our objective was to obtain the most capable multimission maritime helicopter. We have achieved this goal. The MH-60R Seahawk is a proven anytime and anywhere aircraft that best suits our needs,” said Maj. Gen. Flemming Lenfter of the Danish Defense Forces project planning department.

http://www.defmin.fi/files/1226/Administrator_Keijo_Suila_s_report_on_the_Finnish_NH90_procurement_of_1998-2008.pdf

Zwei Hubschrauber NH90 stehen startbereit auf dem Vorfeld des Faßberger Fliegerhorstes. Die Triebwerke und Rotoren laufen schon auf vollen Touren. Es sieht aus, als würden sie jeden Moment abheben. Doch zwei Personen fehlen noch. Es ist der Kommandant des ersten und der Notarzt aus dem zweiten Hubschrauber. Beide sitzen im Gefechtsstand und schreiben konzentriert den „Nine-Liner“ mit, den ihnen der Einsatzoffizier diktiert. Diese neunzeilige Anforderung von der Truppe im Kampfgebiet bildet für sie die Grundlage für den Rettungseinsatz aus der Luft.

Notarzt und Hubschrauberkommandant wiederholen die neun Bestandteile der Meldung. Alles ist richtig verstanden und in das Formular eingetragen. Jetzt ist keine Zeit mehr zu verlieren. Zügig, aber ohne Hast, verlassen beide den Gefechtsstand in Richtung der zwei Hubschrauber. Hier werden sie bereits von den Bordmechanikern erwartet. Sie helfen den Männern beim Anlegen ihrer Ausrüstung und Schutzwesten. Dann werden mittels Bordsprechanlage alle Besatzungsmitglieder über den Inhalt des Nine-Liners informiert. Jetzt kann es losgehen. Ein kleiner Ruck und die Hubschrauber rollen über den Taxi Way zur Rollbahn. Sekunden später heben die Maschinen ab. Ihre Mission: Verwundete Kameraden aus der Kampfzone herausholen und schnellstens in ein Feldlazarett fliegen.

Das Kernstück einer Forward Air MedEvac-Rotte bildet der eigentliche MedEvac-Hubschrauber. Dieser NH90 ist als „Fliegender Notarztwagen“ mit modernster Intensiv-Medizintechnik ausgerüstet: Patientenüberwachungsmonitore, Beatmungsgeräte, Pumpspritzeninjektoren, Ultraschallgerät, Blutgasanalysegeräte und Antischockhosen. Mit dem Intensivmedizin-Equipment ist der NH90 FAM sowohl für die qualifizierte Erstrettung in ein Feldlazarett, als auch für die mögliche Folgeverlegung in eine intensivmedizinisch höherwertige Sanitätseinrichtung ausgestattet.

Der zweite NH90 der Rotte, der Sicherungs- und Escort-Hubschrauber – auch „Chase“ genannt – überwacht mit bodennahen Flugmanövern, um bei Gefahr durch Feindkräfte die FAM-Rettung und das Ausfliegen durch gezieltes Niederhalten mit den zwei Maschinengewehren zu sichern. Neben dem Bordmechaniker ergänzen hier anstatt des Sanitätspersonals zwei Bordschützen die Besatzung. Sie bedienen ein schweres Maschinengewehr M3M, Kaliber 12,7 Millimeter, auf der einen sowie ein Maschinengewehr MG 3, Kaliber 7,62 Millimeter, auf der anderen Seite. Diese MG's sind auf speziellen Lafetten montiert, die einen genau begrenzten Schwenkbereich haben, um keine Beschädigungen am eigenen Fluggerät zu verursachen.